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Compact or Spread-Out Cities: Urban Planning, Taxation, and the
Vulnerability to Transportation Shocks
Summary
This paper shows that cities made more compact by transportation taxation are more
robust than spread-out cities to shocks in transportation costs. Such a shock, indeed,
entails negative transition effects that are caused by housing infrastructure inertia and
are magnified in low-density cities. Distortions due to a transportation tax, however,
have in absence of shock detrimental consequences that need to be accounted for. The
range of beneficial tax levels can, therefore, be identified as a function of the possible
magnitude of future shocks in transportation costs. These taxation levels, which can
reach significant values, reduce city vulnerability and prevent lock-ins in under-optimal
situations.
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Taxation
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Introduction

Coordinating housing needs and mobility practices in cities with high vs. low
densities constitutes the centre of a major controversy in architecture and
urban planning; compact cities found with Le Corbusier (1924) their most
fervent partisan, while extreme dispersion of housing was advocated by F. L.
Wright (see Jenks et al., 1996). As urban sprawl became a strong tendency
in developed countries, economists entered this debate, and began to analyze density in terms of environmental consequences and energy consumption:
Newman and Kenworthy (1989) for instance found a negative relationship between density and per capita energy consumption. This seminal paper was
the origin of a lively debate in the economic literature, and these results were
challenged, for example by Gordon and Richardson (1995).
While this literature focused on long term relationships, the first innovation
of our paper is that it concentrates on short- and medium-run evolutions: we
argue that, over those timescales, spread-out cities are more vulnerable than
compact cities when confronted with an abrupt increase in their transportation
costs. This vulnerability arises from the facts (i) that urban forms are adapted
to transportation systems and costs (Brueckner and Fansler (1983), Yacovissi
and Kern (1995), Song and Zenou (2006)), and (ii) that housing infrastructures
have a strong inertia (Mayer and Somerville, 2000). As a consequence, any
change in transportation costs induces a slow change in urban infrastructures,
which can only take place over very long time scales. Gusdorf and Hallegatte
(2007), hereafter referred to as GH07, show that, as long as housing capital
has not been adapted, the transition that takes place has significant impacts
on households and landowners.
Moreover, energy shocks and climate policies are characterized by imperfect
foresight at the timescales relevant to building turnover, which makes the design of urban policies particularly difficult. Here, therefore, we make the case
for using robustness in face of multiple scenarios, instead of efficiency in one
scenario, as the criterion to manage urbanism. This method could help cities
to face the future and uncertain challenges related to constraints on fossil
energy resources, to geopolitical instability in oil producing countries, or to
climate policies. Transport policies leading to more compact cities, e.g. transport taxation or speed limitation, can be seen as an insurance in this context
of imperfect foresight. For instance, Akerman and Hojer (2006) indicate that
climate policies call for a change in built-up areas, and that an appropriate
transport policy shall be flexible enough to allow for adaptation when more
information is made available on the climate.
In this perspective, the impacts of transportation taxes are more than ever a
crucial issue for policy makers. A robust finding of prospective energy models
2

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2007

3

Mattei Working Papers, Art. 54 [2007]
is that abatementFondazione
costs of Eni
COEnrico
2 emissions will be much higher in the transportation sector than in other sectors (Parry, 2006). Indeed, efficiency gains
of vehicle trigger an important rebound effect on gasoline demand. Also, as
transportation amounts to 19.3% of the average American household’s expenditures (O’Toole, 2003), welfare consequences of taxing gasoline can rapidly
become significant. Economic agents have little room to adapt their behavior
to an increase in oil costs: first, it is difficult to find alternative less carbonintensive transportation technologies. Second, housing prices, firms localizations (Schafer, 1998), behavioral regularities (Schafer, 2000) and previous infrastructure choices (Crassous et al., 2006) constrain the transportation needs.
Hourcade and Gilotte (2000) mention the importance of urban forms for the
design of appropriate carbon taxes, but do not represent the spatial effects of
such a tax. A second originality of our paper is that it fills in this gap.

Using urban microeconomic modeling and numerical simulations, we show
that: (1) cities with pre-existing high transportation tax levels are less vulnerable to energy shocks, and better prepared to future climate policies; in other
cities, housing inertia will induce significant transition effects, such as a fall
in utility level, a decrease in landowners’ incomes, and unintended redistributive effects between households and landowners; (2) if housing infrastructures
are rigid, early taxation can prevent the lock-in of cities in detrimental urban
forms. From a normative point of view, we follow Lempert (2006) who claims
that decision-makers should be provided with information on the robustness
of their strategies with respect to the risks that they are wiling to take or to reject. In this framework, we show that (3) due to redistributive effects between
categories of actors, and between generations, the tax level a government may
choose is strongly dependent on the nature of the optimality criterion (utilitarian vs. Rawlsian), and on the weight attributed to each category of actors;
(4) the implementation of transportation tax is itself an event that may induce
negative transition effects, which can, to a certain extent, be avoided thanks
to a smooth implementation path.

In the following, we set a theoretical framework suited to the analysis of transportation shocks in Section 2. Following GH07, we explicitly represent housing
inertia so as to analyse the effects of such a shock. The basic urban model is
only briefly reproduced, since its main features have been well studied in the
economic literature. In Section 3, we use this model to evaluate the effects of
a shock on transportation prices, and show that cities with high preexisting
taxation levels are more robust to shocks. In Section 4, we characterize the
tax levels that should be chosen by a welfare-maximizing government. Finally,
Section 5 concludes on the consequences for mitigation policies, and provides
insights for future research.
3
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We use a standard urban economics modeling framework à la Von Thuenen,
(Von Thuenen, 1826), as adapted by Alonso (1964), Mills (1967) and Muth
(1969). More precisely, we use the close city model with absentee landowners
specified in Fujita (1989), and the housing production function introduced by
Muth. Since the basic properties of this model, and the relationships on which
it relies, have been presented in other papers (e.g. Wheaton, 1974), we do
not provide here an extensive description of those characteristics. We briefly
present in Section 2.1.2 the behavior of the economic agents, and list in Section
2.1.3 the relationships defining the equilibriums we introduce in Section 2.1.4.
A nomenclature is provided to the reader in Section 2.1.1.
2.1 The Closed City Model with taxation
2.1.1 Nomenclature
CBD

Central Business District, where firms are located

r

distance from CBD

q

housing service per household

s

land area per household

k

housing capital per household

z

composite good

Land(r)

available land surface at distance r

K

capital

n(r)

density of households at distance r

T (r)

transportation costs

Y

income per capita

rf

city frontier

RH (r)

unit housing service rent

Ra

agricultural land rent

H(r)

total housing service at distance r

h(r)

housing service density

U (z, q)

utility function of a household

u

utility level

θ

tax level

σ

discount factor

x∗ (r)

optimal capital-to-land ratio

ρ

capital price

π

tax product

F (K, L) housing service production function
Table 1
Symbols and variables

The variables and functions used in this modeling are listed in Tab. 1 with
their significations. Among this set of variables, we specify the housing service
density h(r) = H(r)/Land(r) = f (x∗ (r)), where the function f is defined by
f (x) = F (1, x).
The function T (r) represents generalized transportation costs, that take into
account the cost of transportation itself as well as the cost of the time spent in
4
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commuting, whichFondazione
could have
been devoted
to work.
Marginal
transportation
cost is assumed to be constant, and no congestion is taken into account, even
though it is an important phenomenon (see e.g. Mayeres and Proost, 2001).

We assume that the government sets a tax level per km of commuting θT (r).
The product 3 of such a tax is given by
π=θ

Zrf

T (r)n(r)r dr

(1)

0

and we will assume that it is lump-sum redistributed to all workers. This
tax level is not intended to pay for investments and infrastructure operating,
which we assume to be included in transportation costs T (r).
As a consequence, the new transportation price and the new income of those
workers are, giving the subscript “a ” to ancient parameters:
T (r) = Ta (r)(1 + θ)

(2)

Y = Ya + π/N
2.1.2 Economic agents
The households
Each household is composed of one worker commuting every day to the CBD.
All workers earn the same income Y , and enjoy utility from a composite good
z and a housing service q. All workers share the same utility function U (z, q).
Each worker chooses his/her housing location r in the city, where the unit
price of housing service at location r is RH (r). He/she maximizes his/her
utility level under a budget constraint:
maxr,z,q U (z, q) s.t. z + RH (r)q ≤ Y − T (r)

(3)

Absentee landowners
A landowner allocates his/her amount of land L to agricultural use or to
residential use. In the first case, the rent drawn from the land will be Ra .L.
In the second case, the landowner invests in housing capital K to produce a
housing service H. Function F is assumed to have constant returns to scale.
3

Note that while T (r) is a generalized transportation cost (i.e. including the cost
of time), the tax θT (r) is fully monetary.

5
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decision
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a landowner
who owns
at location
r, is given by:

maxK

1
[RH (r)F (L, K) − ρK]
1−σ

(4)

The Aggregate Landowners’ Income (ALI) is the income earned by landowners
following their investments:
ALI =

Zrf

h

Land(r) RH (r)f (

0

K i
K
(r)) − ρ (r) dr
L
L

(5)

2.1.3 Formal relationships
We define two kinds of static equilibriums that are likely to emerge, depending
on whether housing supply is endogenous or exogenous. Several relationships
characterize those equilibriums.
If housing supply is exogenous:
all consumers throughout the city have the same utility level u
RH (r) =

n(r) =
N=

Zrf



 maxq≥0

Y −T (r)−Z(q,u)
q


0


 H(r)/q(r, u)

0

for r ≤ rf
for r ≥ rf

for r ≤ rf

(6)

for r ≥ rf

n(r)dr

0

RH (rf , u) ≥ 0

If housing supply is endogenous, we need to add:
x∗ (r) = arg maxx [RH (r)f (x) − ρx]
rf = max[r, RH (r)f (x∗ (r)) − ρx∗ (r) ≥ Ra ]


 Land(r) · f (x∗ (r))

H(r) = 


0

for r ≤ rf

(7)

for r ≥ rf

RH (rf )H(rf ) − ρK ∗ (r) = Ra Land(rf )

6
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Definition 1 (CSExt) A competitive equilibrium with tax and exogenous housing (or CSExt) is reached in the city when, for a given set
of parameters N , Ya , RA , θ, and for given functions H(r), and Ta (r), one
can find parameters and functions u, Y , π, rf , n(r), T (r), RH (r), and z(r)
verifying Eqs. (1), (2) and (6).
Definition 2 (CSEnt) A competitive static equilibrium with tax and
endogenous housing (or CSEnt) is reached in the city when, for a given
set of parameters N , Ya , RA , θ, and for given functions Land(r) and Ta (r)
and F (L, K), one can find parameters and functions u, Y , π, rf , n(r), T (r),
RH (r), z(r) and H(r) verifying Eqs. (1), (2), (6) and (7).

2.2 The city structure

A transportation tax has two effects on urban sprawl, namely on rf , and
on consumers welfare. On the one hand, if a positive tax is implemented,
transportation prices are higher, which shrinks the city boundary, and reduce
households’ utility (see also Wheaton, 1974). On the other hand, the product
of this tax is positive, and is lump-sum distributed to consumers. Thus, the
income of the representative household increases, which improves consumers
utility and expands the city outwards.
Brueckner (2005) shows that the first effect is the strongest on urban sprawl:
a positive tax shrinks the city boundary. What is the optimal subsidy or
taxation level on commuting for consumers utility level? Brueckner asks the
question but cannot tell whether optimal taxation is positive or negative; he
recommends exploring the question with specific functional forms, beginning
with CES and Cobb-Douglas. We do such an analysis with Cobb-Douglas
functions, and show that there is an optimal subsidy for households’ utility
level, partly answering Brueckner’s questioning.
To do so, we use the following functional forms, classically used in urban
7

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper54

8

4 or Spread-Out Cities: Urban Planning, Taxation, and
Gusdorf
Compact
economics
(see and
e.g.Hallegatte:
Fujita, 1989)
:

U (z, q) = z α q β where α, β > 0 and α + β = 1
F (s, k) = Asa k b where a, b, A > 0 and a + b = 1
(8)

T (r) = p.r
Land(r) = l.r
Ra = 0

For the numerical simulations presented in this paper, we calibrated our model
on the Los Angeles agglomeration: 4.3 million workers earn a $20, 700 yearly
income (data U.S. Census Bureau 1999). We use an estimate of transportation
price using 1999 gasoline prices (i.e. 32 cents per km on average, data American Automobile Association 1999), which is a lower bound of transportation
costs. Coefficient β, introduced in Eq. (8), represents the share of households
budget devoted to housing and related expenses (housing equipment, heating,
...), which we set at 25%. For the construction function, we lack robust empirical evaluation, and used A = 1 and a = 0.5. To assess the robustness of
our results, we carried out systematic sensitivity analyses that show that all
qualitative results of the model remain the same in the range of reasonable
parameter values.
2.2.1 Tax effect on the city
A high tax level, which increases the transportation price, makes locations
far from the CBD less sought after, and those close to the CBD more sought
after: consumers agree to pay higher rents to get closer to the CBD, even if it
means that they have to put up with smaller flats. Therefore, the rent curve is
steeper, and landowners invest accordingly. Figure 2.2.1 shows that, through
this mechanism, taxation level influences strongly urban structure.
2.2.2 Landowners
At the aggregate level, landowners are insensitive to transportation prices, but
they are sensitive to the level of taxation:
ALI =

N Ya (1 + θ)
(γ + 3) + θ(γ + 1)

(9)

4

We analytically show in Appendix 6.2.2 that, with these functional forms, there
is both existence and uniqueness of a CSEnt and a CSExt.

8
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h(r)
2

H(r)

2

θ = -0.5
θ=0
θ = + 0.5

1.5
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1.5

1

1

0.5
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0

0
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10
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Fig. 1. Left: housing density h(r) corresponding to different tax levels θ (index
h(0) = 1 for zero tax). Right: housing structure H(r) as a function of the tax level
(index H(10) = 1 for zero tax).
ALI

140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

tax level θ

Fig. 2. The Aggregate Land Income, corresponding to different tax levels (index
ALI = 1 for zero tax).

A tax on transportation creates a market distortion: it gives households an
incentive to commute less and to spend a larger share of their budget on
housing services and other consumer goods. Figure 2 shows that a tax on
transportation increases aggregate landowners’ income.
2.2.3 Tax effects on households
Each tax level θ is associated with a unique utility level, given by:
uγ+1


γ+2
(γ + 2)N
γ+3
Y γ+2
= 2 (1 + θ)γ
lB
p
(γ + 3) + θ(γ + 1)

(10)

The tax or subsidy has two effects on households’ utility. On the one hand,
a tax increases transportation price, which decreases utility. On the other
hand, its product increases the income of consumers, which increases utility.
9
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u

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

tax level θ

Fig. 3. Impact of a tax θ on utility u (index u = 1 for θ = 0).

Of course, the two effects are exactly opposite when the tax is a subsidy. With
the functional forms we use, the optimal balance between these two effects
is reached for a unique subsidy level, corresponding to the maximum of the
utility level given by Eq. (10):
θ∗ = −

1
= −aβ
γ+1

(11)

It is noteworthy that the optimal tax level is strictly negative: households are
given an incentive to commute more, and spend less money on housing 5 .
We now introduce a monetary equivalent to consumers’ utility 6 :
Definition 3 (Equivalent income) In a city where the income is Yequi (u, T (r)),
where the transportation cost function is given by T (r), and where the government sets the optimal tax level θ = θ ∗ , consumers reach the utility level u.
This monetary equivalent will be useful in the analysis of government’s decisions. A utilitarian government taking into account absentee landowners
would maximize a Static Global Welfare (SGW (u, T (r))) expressed in monetary terms as the sum of landowners’ income and of the equivalent income of
consumers:
SGW (u, T (r)) = N.Yequi (u, T (r)) + ALI

(12)

5

This subsidy can for instance consist in the free access to roads and highways
financed by a tax independent of individual transportation behavior.
6 We prefer not to use the criterion specified by Herbert and Stevens (1960): as
energy shocks may have an influence on all cities as well as on rural population, we
do not want to depend on the existence of a reservation utility. Therefore, we rather
define an equivalent income.

10
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If the optimal taxFondazione
level is Eni
defined
the Working
level that
maximizes
SGW , and if
ALI is lump-sum redistributed to consumers, we find (see Appendix 6.1.5)
that the optimal tax level is zero 7 .

3

Compared vulnerability to external transportation shocks

Since our goal is to investigate the vulnerability of cities to shocks in transportation costs, we assume in this section that at one point in time, the transportation costs increase instantaneously from an initial value pi to a final value
pf .
If housing capital is fixed, GH07 show that the transportation shock effects
are worse than under the malleability assumption (in the latter case, housing
infrastructures adapt instantaneously). They find that this worsening is not
negligible, and entails also important distributive effects between landowners
and households, and among landowners. They do not account, however, for
the effects of taxation levels. In the remaining of this section, we analyze a
situation where households and landowners adopt a myopic behavior, in a city
where a pre-existing taxation level θ has been implemented. To analyze cities
with different taxation levels, we compare the medium-run situation with a
long run equilibrium where the optimal taxation level θ ∗ is implemented. We
use this final period as a common reference to study the medium-run effects
of different values of θi , the initial value of the tax.

3.1 Accounting for inertia during the transition
We consider three periods: (1) the initial period, before the shock, during
which the city is assumed to be at its long-run equilibrium with a transportation price p and a tax level θi . (2) The final period, during which the city is
at its new long-run equilibrium, fully adapted to the new transportation price
pf and a tax level θ ∗ . This period takes place a long time after the shock, at
least several decades: based on Jin and Zeng (2004), the buildings turnover in
an American city is complete in 60 to 70 years. (3) An intermediary period, or
medium period. Goodwin et al. (2004) review the literature on the response
to transportation cost changes, and find a short-term response taking place
within approximately 5 to 10 years after the shock 8 . Thus, the medium pe7

This also the optimal tax level that Brueckner (2005) finds for a classical HerbertStevens criterion.
8 Due to the timescales we consider, what we call here a “short-term” response is
for Goodwin et al. (2004) a long-term response.

11

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper54

12

Gusdorf
Hallegatte: Compact
or Spread-Out
Cities: Urban
Planning,
Taxation,
riod takes
placeandapproximately
between
one decade
after the
shock
and a and
few
decades after the shock.

During the medium period, the housing-supply structure is not adapted to the
new transportation price, because of the long adjustment delay in buildings
and city structure. Households, on the other hand, have adjusted their behavior to the new transportation price and the available housing infrastructure
(see GH07).
Variables and parameters corresponding to these periods will be characterized
by a subscript i, f , or m. In the initial period, households and landowners
make their decisions as if pi should not change. We test different values of θi
so as to evaluate the potential for anticipation through a tax in the initial
period.
Hence,
(1) initial period is characterized by a CSEnt with transportation price pi
and a tax level θi ;
(2) medium period is characterized by a CSExt with transportation price pf ,
a tax level θf = θ ∗ and a housing structure inherited from the initial
period: Hm (r) = Hi (r).
(3) final period is characterized by a CSEnt with transportation price pf and
a tax level θf = θ ∗ ;

3.2 Effects on landowners

Section 2.2.2 established that, in the initial period, landowners’ income unambiguously gets larger as θi increases. In the medium run, however, a larger
θi has two effects on ALIm :
(i) initial investment is higher, which decreases ALIm ;
(ii) housing is more and more concentrated towards the CBD (see Eq. (17)),
where people devote less money to commuting, and more to housing. As a
consequence, the aggregate housing rent is also larger in the medium run,
which increases ALIm .
What is the balance between those two effects? Figure 4 shows that ALIm
decreases with respect to θi when θi < 0.2; above this value, a larger θi induces
a higher ALIm . Thus, there is a worst value of initial tax level for landowners
during the medium period. In that case, ALIm is 21% lower than ALIf . Beyond
this worst value, a larger θi induces higher aggregate income in both the initial
and the medium periods.
12
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120
110

ALI

100
90
80

ALIi
ALIm
ALIf

70
-0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
θi

Fig. 4. For a doubling of transportation price, impact of θ i on ALI (index
ALIf = 100).

3.3 Effects on households

ui
um
uf

1

0.9

0.8

0.7
-0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
θi

Fig. 5. For a doubling of transportation price, the impact of tax levels θ i on utility
levels ui , um and uf (index ui = 1 for θi = θ ∗ ).

In the medium run, Fig. 5 shows that, for θi < 1, consumers benefit from a
larger θi . Beyond this value, they lose from it. When the taxation level in the
initial period increases beyond this threshold, consumers utility decreases both
in the initial and in the medium period. Thus, the situation of households is
the opposite to that of landowners.

3.4 Vulnerable and robust cities
Previous results suggest that cities’ vulnerability is not a concept that can
be handled without distinguishing between several categories of agents. For
instance, for a shock corresponding to a doubling of transportation prices,
Tab. 2 shows the diverging interests of landowners and households:
13
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∗

results are in %

θi = θ < 0

θi = 1

θi = 2

−20

−17.2

−10.8

−3.4

+1.1

0

ALIm −ALIf
(Landowners)
ALIf
um −uf
(Households)
uf

Table 2
For a doubling of transportation price, the situation of agents in the medium run,
relative to the final situation, for various levels of θ i .

A city with an initial subsidy to commuting (θi = θ ∗ ) is very vulnerable
over the medium run to a transportation price shock: households support a
−3.4% utility loss compared to the final period, while landowners suffer from
a −20% decrease in their income compared to the final period. Those losses
would be reduced in a city where preexisting taxation levels are higher: for
θi = 1, landowners’ aggregate loss is reduced to −17.2%, while households
are actually better off during the transition than at the final stage. An even
higher θi would be preferred by landowners, but is detrimental to households.
Thus, if a government decides to send a signal price to economic actors so
as to anticipate the possibility of a future shock in transportation prices, our
results indicate that there are positive tax levels that lead to less vulnerable
cities.
Choosing θi , therefore, influences the urban form (spread-out vs. compact) in
a crucial manner. A lock-in effect is likely to happen with low transportation
costs and no taxation. Once the city has gone through an urban sprawl process,
turning back to a more compact urbanism is a long and costly transition.
Moreover, the larger the inertia of housing capital, the most important for
welfare is the medium period, since initial tax level θi shapes then the urban
forms for a longer period of time.

4

Normative aspects

The normative evaluation shall take into account not only the medium run
period following the shock, but also the effects of θi on the initial, pre-shock,
period. Furthermore, actors that are to be taken into account in these criteria
may also differ according to local institutions.

4.1 Robust vs. vulnerable strategies
In view of Sections 3.2 and 3.3, the determination of a socially optimal tax θi
proves difficult:
14
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(i) For a same actor
(a household,
or a Working
landowner),
θi may have
opposite effects in the initial period and in the medium period.
(ii) In a given period, changing θi may have opposite effects on two categories
of actors.

Furthermore, the uncertainty in future transportation costs, and the subsequent impossibility of perfect foresight, makes this situation even more complex. Lempert et al. (2004), for example, claim that the deep uncertainties surrounding climate change issues should lead decision-makers to choose strategies with the most acceptable vulnerabilities. Here, we have to assume that
the government does not know several decades in advance the magnitude of
the shock(s) that it will have to face. In such a situation, it may be more
useful not to look for an optimal tax, but rather to characterize the situations
in which a given tax level θi has a positive impact on the welfare criterion,
compared with the “do-nothing” strategy θi = 0. To do so, we will assess, for
each shock amplitude, which tax levels are beneficial or detrimental.
In what follows, we present a utilitarian and a Rawlsian criterion, which, as
we will see, lead to different recommendations for policy action.
The utilitarian criterion
If only consumers utility is accounted for, the utilitarian government’s welfare
criterion is represented by:
WCU = λui + (1 − λ)um
where λ and (1 − λ) are the relative weights the government places on the
situations in period i and m. The actual value of λ depends on the time
at which the shock will occur and on the preference for the present. In the
following, we assume that the time of the shock is known (i.e. λ is known),
while its magnitude is uncertain. Adding uncertainty on time is possible within
our framework, but it does not change the qualitative results of our study.
If the government takes into account not only the well-being of households, but
also the wealth of landowners, the optimality criterion is modified accordingly,
taking into account SGW as defined in Eq. (12). The government maximizes
then an Intertemporal Global Welfare (IGW ) over the initial and the medium
period:
U
WCL
= IGW = λSGW (ui , pi ) + (1 − λ)SGW (um , pm )

Let us set µ = pf /pi as the magnitude of the shock. Figure 6 shows, for the
utilitarian criterion and for each shock µ, the tax levels θi that have beneficial
consequences compared with no pre-existing taxation. Two cases are studied,
15
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Fig. 6. Impact of θi for a utilitarian government (λ = 1/2): green areas correspond
U
to the couples (θi ,µ) that ensure a better outcome than (0,µ) for W CU (C) and WCL
(CL) respectively. In red areas, both criteria perform worse than θ i = 0.

depending on the weight that is attributed to landowners’ income. It appears
U
that a subsidy to commuting is never beneficial for WCL
, and is beneficial for
U
WC only for low values of µ: this property emphasizes that very spread-out
cities are particularly vulnerable to transportation shocks.
U
If a value θi > 0 is beneficial for WCU , then it is also beneficial for WCL
, but
the opposite is not true. Two reasons explain this asymmetry: first, low initial
(positive) values of θi profit to consumers in both periods, while they induce
gains for landowners in the initial period that are sufficient to compensate for
their losses in the medium run. Second, high values of θi induce smaller utility
levels for consumers, but larger landowners’ income in both initial and medium
periods (see Figs. 4 and 5 for example, which illustrate the case µ = 2).

The rawlsian criterion
This criterion is an intertemporal maximin: the government’s behavior is described either by:


WCR = maxθi min[ui , um ]
if only consumers are taken into account, or by


R
WCL
= maxθi min[SGWi , SGWm ]



if landowners’ income is also taken into account.
Corresponding results are presented in Fig. 7. As in the utilitarian case, the
choice of θi is more restricted for WC than for WCL . Also, compared to the
16
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Fig. 7. Impact of θi for a utilitarian government (λ = 1/2): green areas correspond
to the couples (θi ,µ) that ensure a better outcome than (0,µ) for W CR (C), and for
R (CL) respectively. In red areas, both criteria perform worse than θ = 0.
WCL
i

utilitarian case, high tax levels are a more robust choice in this Rawlsian
case. This is so because an intertemporal maximin takes into account only
the medium period, where consumers utility is always lower than in the initial
period, at least fot the values of θi and µ that we explored.
Following the Lempert’s methodology, therefore, we showed, for each possible future transportation price, the first-period tax levels that are beneficial, for two possible criteria. We claim that, based on these results, decisionmakers can implement informed policies, as a function of their beliefs on future
changes and of political parameters and value judgments.

4.2 The implementation of a transportation tax
Our results have pragmatic policy implications: it is possible to make a city
more robust with respect to future possible changes in transportation prices.
Taxing in advance transportation sends to consumers and landowners an appropriate signal-price. In particular, cities that are being built now (as is the
case in developing countries where demography is increasing at a tremendous
pace) should take into account the possibility of future price increases. They
should thus build housing infrastructures that are more robust to the possibility of an increase in energy prices. Implementing an appropriate tax is a way
to do so.
In cities where housing is already adapted to low energy prices, such as north17
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ern American
however,
reaching
a less vulnerable
shalland
be
done with caution: implementing abruptly a new transportation tax is also a
shock that can be detrimental. Nevertheless, a shock due to a tax is different
from a shock due to an increase in energy prices, since the tax product is
lump-sum redistributed to consumers. Thus, they pay higher transportation
prices, but the tax product is added to their income 9 . As shown in Fig. 8,
this difference influences significantly the consequences of the shock.
1.1

u(θ)
u(p’)

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0

1

2

3

4

5

tax level θ, or price p’

Fig. 8. Impact of a tax θ vs. a price p0 = p(1 + θ) on utility u (index u = 1 for
θ = 0).

Nevertheless, we show in this section that a tax implementation induces a transition period that also calls for anticipation. In a new numerical experiment,
the transportation price p is constant while the tax level is the only changing
variable. Again, we consider three periods: the initial period when the tax
level is θi = θ ∗ ; the medium period where the chosen tax level θf has already
been set, but housing infrastructure is not adapted yet (Hm (r) = Hi (r)); and
a final period, where the tax level is θf , and where housing infrastructure is
adapted to this new signal-price.
Households: starting from a CSEnt where θi = θ ∗ , households cannot gain
from a change in tax levels as long as transportation price p stays at the same
level. Figure 9 shows that this deterioration of their situation can be deepened
during the medium period. Since the tax product is lump-sum redistributed,
however, the consequences of a shock remain limited. 10
Landowners: setting a transportation tax creates a market distortion, which
leads households to choose locations where they have to commute less, but
pay higher rents. Rents close to the CBD increase, and they decrease far from
the CBD. In the long run, this mechanism increases aggregate housing rents,
9

Figure 8 shows for instance that a doubling of the price through a tax θ = p
induces a 10% loss of utility, while a transportation cost p 0 = 2p induces a 16% loss.
10 For instance, for θ = 1, households are better off during the transition. For
f
θf = 2, the amplification of consumers utility losses during the transition is 3.7%.

18
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and aggregate housing
capital
Thus,Working
two effects
impact
m
to ALIf : on the one hand, there is under-investment in the medium period,
while rents have already increased. This should push ALIm above ALIf . On
the other hand, the investments performed to adapt housing in the final period
lead to higher aggregate rents, which pushes ALIf above ALIm . Both effects
increase with respect to the taxation level θf . The right side of Fig. 9 shows
that the first effect is the strongest for high θf . However, these effects of the
transition on landowners remain limited in amplitude. 11
10

(um-uf)/uf
0

(ALIm-ALIf)/ALIf

8
6
%

%

-1
4
2

-2

0
-3

-2
0.5

1

1.5

2
θf

2.5

3

3.5

4

0

0.5

1

1.5

2
θf

2.5

3

3.5

4

Fig. 9. Impact of tax levels θf on - Left: utility levels um and uf . -Right: ALIm
compared to ALIf .

Our theoretical framework is not complex enough to treat the question of the
optimal path of the signal price. A follow-up paper using a continuous-time
model will cope with this question. Our results suggest, however, that the
implementation of a new tax level induces a transition that has contrasted effects for households and landowners, even though these impacts remain limited
compared with the effects of a shock in transportation costs.

5

Conclusion

Even though the controversy on compact vs. spread-out cities is far from
being closed, policy makers in most European countries have decided to adopt
a strong attitude on the subject, and to mitigate urban sprawl. This paper
adds an argument in favor of this decision. We do not pretend to give the exact
picture of the consequences of a transportation shock, but we have explored
the orders of magnitude at stake. Our results suggest that cities made more
compact by a transportation tax are significantly more robust than others to
a shock in transportation price, in spite of the negative effect of the tax before
the shock.
11

For instance, for θf = 1, transition gains are only 2.5% higher in the medium run
than in the medium run. For θf = 2, the difference is 6%.
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http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper54

20

Gusdorf
Hallegatte:
Compact
or Spread-Out
Cities:
Planning,progressively
Taxation, and
The reasons
forand
this
property
are that
(1) a tax can
beUrban
introduced
and its implementation can be managed, while an energy price shock cannot
be controlled; (2) a shock created by the introduction of a tax is mitigated
by the redistribution of the tax product while a shock on the transportation
price (or speed) is only detrimental. Moreover, the lump-sum redistribution
assumed in our model could, in a more realist framework, be sophisticated
to take into account the pre-existing tax structure. Alleviating labor charges,
for instance, could produce a so-called “double-dividend”, in addition to the
benefits described in this paper.

In our framework, for a doubling of the transportation costs, in a city with a
high pre-existing tax level (θi = 1), households’ utility is +1.1% higher in the
medium run compared to the final utility with optimal taxation, and landowners’ income is decreased by −17.2%. With a lower pre-existing taxation level
(θi = θ ∗ ), those figures are respectively −3.4% and −20%. The importance
of early taxation is even larger if housing capital is considered as fixed once
it is built: low initial transportation costs determine a highly spread-out city,
locked in an under-optimal situation if transportation price increases. This
argument is critical in developing countries where cities experience (or will
experience) a rapid growth. Those cities are, to a certain extent, still to be
built, and future changes due to mitigation policies or resource constraints
should be taken into account as soon as possible.
In industrialized countries, raising tax levels in vulnerable cities may be a serious problem. The reason is that housing infrastructure already exists, and
represents huge investments. This factor may help understand why US government is reluctant to implement a climate policy that would lead to non
negligible negative welfare effects in American particularly spread-out cities
during the transition towards a more robust equilibrium. Meanwhile, it is also
reasonable to think that housing inertia should not lead to inaction, but rather
to early commitments and progressive action. A well conceived transportation
system may be considered as an insurance against numerous risks, from energy
security to climate mitigation needs.
The modelling framework we used in this paper presents several important
limitations, that were already presented in GH07 (e.g. the absence of general equilibrium feedback mechanisms, or the assumption that the city has
one unique CBD). In spite of these limitations, however, our results show
significant stylised facts, which should be accounted for in more exhaustive
frameworks. Follow-up papers will progressively answer to several limitations,
in particular to focus on macroeconomic feedbacks and on a more realistic
description of the dynamics of moves, housing investments, and rent levels.
In a more general framework, two main insights for future research can be
drawn from our results. First, the use of taxation policies as a tool to antici20
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this regard, the
timing of the tax implementation is an important aspect of taxation policies.
Second, this paper also encourages governments to take into account future
environment constraints in all domains of public policy, for instance by linking urbanism, land-use, transportation and climate policies. This view calls,
therefore, for a “mainstreaming” of environmental concerns in public policy.
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6.1 Relationships in a CSEnt
6.1.1 Characteristics of the Urban System
1
Setting γ = aβ
− 1 and B = (Ab)1/a (αα β β )1/aβ bρab/a , the solutions of the
equilibrium problem satisfy:

s(r, u) =

uγ+1
[Y
B(γ+1)

− pr]−γ

(13)

rf (u) = Y /p
Concerning the housing service rent:


RH (r, u) = αα β β

Y − p(1 + θ)r 1/β
u

From this we get:


RH (r, u) = W pa(γ+3) [V (θ)

where V (θ) =

γ+3
,
(γ+3)+θ(γ+1)

a
1/β 
Ya
− r]
(1 + θ)[Ya V (θ)]−(γ+2)
p

and W = (αα β β )1/β ( N (γ+2
)a .
lB

6.1.2 Utility level
Let us first assume that there is no transportation tax set by the government.
In this case, Eq. (6) on the city population implies:
N=

Zrf
0

L(r)
dr =
s(r, u)

Zrf

lrB(γ + 1)[Y − pr]γ u−(γ+1) dr

0

This equation gives us the relation:
 R  γ+1 γ + 1
Y γ+2
p2 N
RA
A γ+2
= −Y
+u
+ u−(γ+1)
lB
B
B
γ+2
γ+2

(14)

Right Hand Side of relation (14) is strictly decreasing with u as soon as u is
such that rf can be positive. The interpretation of the decrease of RHS of (14)
with u is that, ceteris paribus, an increase in u implies that N shall decrease,
i.e. some people shall leave the city.
23
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6.1.3 Tax
product

We consider now that a tax pθ per km of commuting is levied throughout the
city, thus T (r) = p(1 + θ)r. Thus, (13) implies:
π(u) = pθ
rf (π, u) =

R rf
0

n(r, u)r dr =

1
[Y
p(1+θ)

pθlB(γ+1)
uγ+1
1

R rf
0

r 2 [Y + π/N − p(1 + θ)r]γ dr

+ π/N − ( RBA ) γ+1 u]

(15)

In addition, (14) can be rewritten:
N 2
p (1
lB

+ θ)2 = − RBA (Y + π/N ) +

γ+2

γ+1 RA γ+1
( ) u
γ+2 B

+

u−(γ+1)
(Y
γ+2

+ π/N )−(γ+1)

Let us assume for simplicity’s sake that RA = 0. Then the previous analysis
gives :
π(u) =

(Y +π/N )γ+3
2pθlB
p3 (1+θ)3 uγ+1 (γ+2)(γ+3)

p2 (1+θ)2 N
lB

)
= u−(γ+1) (Y +π/N
γ+2

γ+2

From these relationships, we derive:
2θY
π
=
N
(γ + 3) + θ(γ + 1)

(16)

6.1.4 Housing structure
The construction throughout the city is given by the function:
H(r) = n(r, θ)q(r, θ) = lrF (1, k(r, θ)/s(r, θ)).
Using (13), we have then:


H(r) = A0 lr bβ(γ + 1)(γ + 2)

b
N
Y (γ + 3)
Y (γ + 3)
(1 + θ)(
)−(γ+2) (
− r)γ+1 (
l
(γ + 3) + θ(γ + 1)
p(γ + 3) + pθ(γ + 1)

where A0 is a constant depending on the parameters of the problem.

6.1.5 Lump-sum redistribution of ALI
In this section, we assume Ra = 0. If the product of the housing industry is
to be lump-sum redistributed to the city inhabitants, then Eqs. (1) , (5) and
24
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As a result,
these variables
an extended
version of Eq. (15):

π=

(Ya +π/N +ALI/N )γ+3
2pθlB
p3 (1+θ)3 uγ+1
(γ+2)(γ+3)

p2 (1+θ)2 N
lB

)
= u−(γ+1) (Ya +π/N +ALI/N
γ+2

γ+2

(18)

Bl
Y γ+3
uγ+1 p2 (1+θ)2 (γ+2)(γ+3)

ALI =

As a consequence:
2θ Y
π = N 1+θ
γ+3
Y
ALI = N γ+3

From these relationships, we get: Y =

(γ+3)(1+θ)
Y
(γ+2)+θγ a

=
Using this value of Y in Eq. (10), we get: uγ+1 (γ+2)N
lB
which is maximum for θ = 0.

Yaγ+2
(1+θ)γ
p2



γ+2
γ+3
,
(γ+2)+θγ

6.2 Relationships in the medium-term equilibrium, with exogenous housing
structure
6.2.1 New households density
If the government sets a transportation tax pθm during second period, housing
service consumption is now:
−α/β
q(um , r) = u1/β
m (α[Y + πm /N − pm (1 + θm )r])

and as a consequence:
nm (um , r) = H(r)/q(um , r).
In addition, we know that πm and um must verify:
πm = p m θ m
N=

rZf m

rZf m

nm (um , r)rdr

0

nm (um , r)dr

0

where rf m =

Y +πm /N
.
pm (1+θm )

25

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper54

26

and Hallegatte:
Compact or
In orderGusdorf
to simplify
our notations,
weSpread-Out
write: Cities: Urban Planning, Taxation, and
1
q(um ,r)

= J.(K − r)k , where J is a number depending on um and θm , while K
depends on θm and πm , and k = α/β. One might notice that K = rf m .

6.2.2 Existence and uniqueness of the medium-term equilibrium
In this section, we cope with the question of the existence and uniqueness of
an equilibrium and the medium-term equilibrium. A CSExt, if it exists, can
be characterized by two relationships:
πm = pθm CJ
N = CJ

ZK

ZK

(D − r)d (K − r)k r 2 dr

0

(19)

(D − r)d (K − r)k rdr

0

+πm /N
where J is a number depending on um and pθm ; K = Yp(1+θ
; k = α/β;
m)
we set C, D and d so as to reformulate (17): H(r) = C(D − r)d . Studying
a medium-term equilibrium is then equivalent to studying a solution to the
system (19), where C, D, d and k are exogenous, while J and K verify:

, J 0 being exogenous,
J = J 0 u−1/β
m
0<K=

Y +πm /N
pm (1+θm )

≤D

In addition, all those parameters and variables are positive.
We treat this problem as a system of two equations with two unknown variables, πm /N and um . We set x = πm /N , and consider the related equation
(which is in fact the ratio of the terms of the first relationship and of the
second relationship):
x

K(x)
Z

d

k

(D − r) (K(x) − r) rdr = pθm

0

K(x)
Z

(D − r)d (K(x) − r)k r 2 dr

(20)

0

One might note that if there is a couple (x∗ , u∗m ) verifying Eq. (19), then
clearly x∗ must satisfy Eq. (20). Conversely, suppose there is a x∗ verifying
pθm
Eq. (20), then setting u∗m = ( N
CJ 0
x∗

that (x∗ , u∗m ) satisfies Eq. (19).

ZK ∗

(D − r)d (K ∗ − r)k r 2 dr)β , one can see

0
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Thus, both existence
and uniqueness
of aWorking
solution
to Eq.
are equivalent
to existence and uniqueness of a solution to Eq. (20). Both sides of this relationship are continuous with respect to x. Assume for instance that θm > 0.
Then, for x = 0, Left Hand Side is worth 0 while Right Hand Side is strictly
positive. Thus, the difference between those two sides is strictly negative. For
x = θm Y , then the difference between those two expressions is:

θm

K(x)
Z

(D − r)d (K(x) − r)k r(Y − pr)dr

(21)

0

which is strictly positive. If θm is negative, the same conclusion applies.

Thus, there is at least one x for which Eq. (20) holds, and the existence of an
equilibrium during the medium-run is proved. Furthermore, for θm > 0 (resp.
< 0), he expression in Eq. (21) is strictly increasing (resp.decreasing) with x.
This proves the uniqueness of the solution to Eq. (20).
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